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Re:一些关于设计的文章 ※ 来源: 同济网论坛 BBS.TONGJI.NET
引用:How to Beat NIKE(2)
Adi settled down in the mid- to late-'90s under new ownership, and it has clawed its way back to relevance. One of its first steps was hiring a Nike guy, a marketing genius named Rob Strasser, who was sometimes called ''the man who saved Nike'' because of his work on the Air concept. Strasser asked that Adi's American operations be moved to Oregon, near Nike's offices, but before he could do much else, he died of a heart attack.
Adidas, though, got its act together in Portland. The company's goal is to get ahead by understanding its customers better, banking on its suddenly popular vintage models and strategically setting prices just beneath its main competitor's top line. With all of this, Adidas has pulled into fourth place in American sales, a little behind New Balance and Reebok. Back in the distance, but gaining, is Puma.
These challengers are opening up new fronts in the sneaker wars, and they have a common enemy, which Liedtke gestures toward as he stands at the wide picture window behind his desk. Liedtke looks out across the Willamette River, beyond the glass towers of downtown Portland. There, he says, just out of sight, is ''where the Berm begins,'' a grassy rise encircling the massive, opulent campus that is the world headquarters for the all-powerful but increasingly vulnerable Nike.
On a late afternoon, just outside the Berm, I am jogging down a trail that twists through an evergreen forest. Running alongside me is John Hoke, the 38-year-old creative director of footwear design for Nike. Hoke is a former architect, a compulsively doodling dyslexic, a guy who lives to make high-tech, innovative footwear.
Hoke, of course, is wearing a pair of Nikes. Spotless new Nike Shox running shoes. The kind with the four foam cylinders under the heel, like shock absorbers. These Shox columns trampoline Hoke's foot forward each time his heel strikes the trail, creating exceptional ''energy return.'' This system, the closest thing yet to a shoe that runs by itself, took more than 15 years to perfect. ''Whole companies came and went in the time it took to get Shox right,'' Hoke says.
When at last deemed ready, in 2000, Shox was set loose on the world with tremendous fanfare. Nike proudly put the technology in the heels of its basketball, running and cross-training lines. They were supposed to cause a big sensation, but customers did not follow Nike's plan. They failed to fall in love with Shox.
Nike claimed that the problems had to do with the upper, not the Shox columns themselves. The Shox Vince Carter basketball shoe, named for the Toronto Raptors star, for example, had bright blue uppers and a zipper instead of laces. Kids didn't like the shade of blue, zippers were suddenly out and so it went for Vince.
But Shox lines in other categories didn't fare much better, and not all of them had lame colors and fasteners. Indeed, the Shox debacle illuminated a deeper concern within Nike. After starting out in its very early days as a low-price alternative to Adidas, Nike built its reputation on the idea that technologically advanced sneakers would be considered cool, even if that technology was irrelevant to the way most people used its sneakers. The products that came to define the company were high-tech, wow-factor, ultramodern sneakers that sell for $100 or more. This strategy helped Nike become a company that does $10 billion a year in business and sells almost one out of every two sneakers in America.
But Nike finds itself slightly out of step with the market it has long been able to dominate. The trend among kids is toward simpler, cleaner, old-school looks, a market driven by Skechers, Puma and to a decent extent Adidas. These models cost more like $60 to $80, well below the margins Nike likes to hit, and they're popular in emerging new categories like skateboarding, where Nike can't get traction (''Just do it,'' after all, is not exactly the same as ''just rip it.'')
Meanwhile, on Nike's other flank, New Balance has steadily stolen a share of the straight-ahead, no-nonsense running-shoe market. Suddenly, Nike is neither the fashion sneaker nor the practical sneaker. It is the techno-sneaker at a time when techno is losing its allure. [ 本帖最后由 colourphilosoph 于 2007-4-28 10:39 编辑 ]
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